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No. 110
As policymakers confront the ongoing U.S.
financial crisis, it is important to take a step back
and understand its origins. Those who fault
“deregulation,” “unfettered capitalism,” or “greed”
would do well to look instead at flawed institu-
tions andmisguided policies.
The expansion in risky mortgages to under-
qualified borrowers was encouraged by the federal
government. The growth of “creative” nonprime
lending followed Congress’s strengthening of the
Community Reinvestment Act, the Federal Hous-
ing Administration’s loosening of down-payment
standards, and the Department of Housing and
UrbanDevelopment’spressuring lenders toextend
mortgages toborrowerswhopreviouslywouldnot
have qualified.
Meanwhile, FreddieMac and FannieMae grew
to own or guarantee about half of the United
States’ $12 trillionmortgagemarket.Congression-
al leaders pointedly refused tomoderate themoral
hazard problem of implicit guarantees or other-
wise rein in their hyperexpansion, instead pushing
them to promote “affordable housing” through
expanded purchases of nonprime loans to low-
income applicants.
The credit that fueled these risky mortgages
was provided by the cheap money policy of the
Federal Reserve. Following the 2001 recession,
Fed chairman Alan Greenspan slashed the fed-
eral funds rate from 6.25 to 1.75 percent. It was
reduced further in 2002 and 2003, reaching a
record low of 1 percent in mid-2003—where it
stayed for a year. This set off what economist
Steve Hanke called “the mother of all liquidity
cycles and yet another massive demand bubble.”
The actual causes of our financial troubles
were unusual monetary policy moves and novel
federal regulatory interventions. These poorly
chosen policies distorted interest rates and asset
prices, diverted loanable funds into the wrong
investments, and twisted normally robust finan-
cial institutions into unsustainable positions.
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Introduction
Mortgage foreclosure rates in the United
States have risen to the highest level since the
Great Depression. The nation’s two largest
financial institutions, the government-spon-
sored mortgage purchasers and repackagers
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have gone into
bankruptcy-like “conservatorship.” Several
major investmentbanks, insurancecompanies,
and commercial banks heavily tied to real
estate lending have gone bankrupt outright or
have been sold for cents on the dollar. Prices
and trading volumes inmortgage-backed secu-
rities have shrunk dramatically. Reluctance to
lend has spread to other markets. To prepare
the ground for a return to normalcy in
American credit markets we must understand
the character of the problemswe currently face
and how those problems arose.
WhatDidn’tHappen
Some commentators (and both presiden-
tial candidates) have blamed the current
financial mess on greed. But if an unusually
high number of airplanes were to crash this
year, would it make sense to blame gravity?
No. Greed, like gravity, is a constant. It can’t
explain why the number of financial crashes
is higher than usual. There has been no
unusual epidemic of blackheartedness.
Others have blamed deregulation or (in the
words of one representative) “unregulated free-
market lending run amok.” Such an indict-
ment is necessarily skimpy on the particulars,
because there has actually been no recent dis-
mantling of banking and financial regulations.
Regulations were in fact intensified in the
1990s in ways that fed the development of the
housing finance crisis, as discussed below. The
lastmove in the direction of financial deregula-
tion was the bipartisan Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, signed by President
Clinton. That act opened the door for financial
firmstodiversify: aholdingcompanythatowns
a commercial bank subsidiary may now also
own insurance, mutual fund, and investment-
bank subsidiaries. Far from contributing to the
recent turmoil, the greater freedom allowed by
the act has clearly been a blessing in containing
it. Without it, JPMorgan Chase could not have
acquired Bear Stearns, nor could Bank of
America have acquired Merrill Lynch—acquisi-
tions that avoided losses to Bear’s andMerrill’s
bondholders. Without it, Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley could not have switched spe-
cialties to become bank holding companies
when it became clear that they could no longer
survive as investment banks.
WhatDidHappen—
andWhy?
The actual causes of our financial troubles
were unusualmonetary policymoves and nov-
el federal regulatory interventions. These poor-
ly chosen public policies distorted interest
rates and asset prices, diverted loanable funds
into the wrong investments, and twisted nor-
mally robust financial institutions into unsus-
tainable positions.
Let’s review how the crisis has unfolded.
Problems first surfaced in “exotic” or “flexible”
home mortgage lending. Creative lenders and
originators had expanded the volume of
unconventional mortgages with high default
risks (reflected in nonprime ratings), which are
the housing market’s equivalent of junk
bonds. Unconventional mortgages helped to
feed a run-up in condo and house prices.
House prices peaked and turned downward.
Borrowers with inadequate income relative to
their debts,many of whomhad either counted
onbeing able to borrowagainst a higher house
value in the future in order to help themmeet
theirmonthlymortgagepayments, oronbeing
able to “flip” the property at a price thatwould
more than repay their mortgage, began to
default. Default rates on nonprimemortgages
rose to unexpected highs. The high risk on the
mortgages came back to bite mortgage hold-
ers, the financial institutions to whom the
monthly payments were owed. Firms directly
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holding mortgages saw reduced cash flows.
Firms holding securitized mortgage bundles
(often called “mortgage-backed securities”)
additionally saw the expectation of continuing
reductions in cash flows reflected in declining
market values for their securities. Uncertainty
about future cash flows impaired the liquidity
(resalability) of their securities.
Doubts about the value of mortgage-
backed securities led naturally to doubts about
the solvency of institutions heavily invested in
those securities. Financial institutions thathad
stocked up on junkmortgages and junk-mort-
gage-backed securities found their stock prices
dropping. The worst cases, like Countrywide
Financial, the investment banks Lehman
Brothers and Merrill Lynch, and the govern-
ment-sponsored mortgage purchasers Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, went broke or had to
find a last-minute purchaser to avoid bank-
ruptcy. Firms heavily involved in guaranteeing
mortgage-backed securities, like the insurance
giant AIG, likewise ran aground. Suspect
financial institutions began finding it difficult
to borrow, because potential lenders could not
confidently assess the chance that an institu-
tion might go bankrupt and be unable to pay
themback. Credit flows among financial insti-
tutions became increasingly impeded by such
solvency worries.
Given this sequence of events, the expla-
nation of our credit troubles requires an
explanation for the unusual growth of mort-
gage lending—particularly nonprime lend-
ing, which fed the housing bubble that burst
—leading in turn to the unusual number of
mortgage defaults, financial institution
crashes, and attendant credit-market inhibi-
tions.
There is no doubt that private miscalcula-
tion and imprudence have made matters
worse for more than a few institutions. Such
mistakes help to explain which particular
firms have run into the most trouble. But to
explain industrywide errors, we need to identi-
fy policy distortions capable of having indus-
trywide effects.
We can group most of the unfortunate
policies under two main headings: (1) Federal
Reserve credit expansion that provided the
means for unsustainable mortgage financing,
and (2) mandates and subsidies to write riski-
er mortgages. The enumeration of regrettable
policies below is by nomeans exhaustive.
Providing the Funds:
Federal Reserve Credit
Expansion
In the recessionof 2001, theFederalReserve
System, under Chairman Alan Greenspan,
began aggressively expanding the U.S. money
supply. Year-over-year growth in theM2mone-
tary aggregate rose briefly above 10 percent,
and remained above 8 percent entering the sec-
ondhalf of 2003. The expansionwas accompa-
nied by the Fed repeatedly lowering its target
for the federal funds (interbank short-term)
interest rate. The federal funds rate began2001
at 6.25 percent and ended the year at 1.75 per-
cent. It was reduced further in 2002 and 2003,
inmid-2003 reachinga record lowof1percent,
where it stayed for a year. The real Fed funds
rate was negative—meaning that nominal rates
were lower than thecontemporary rateof infla-
tion—for two and a half years. In purchasing-
power terms, during that period a borrower
was not paying but rather gaining in propor-
tion to what he borrowed. Economist Steve
Hankehas summarized the result: “This set off
themother of all liquidity cycles and yet anoth-
ermassive demand bubble.”
The so-called Taylor Rule—a formula de-
vised by economist John Taylor of Stanford
University—provides a now-standard method
of estimatingwhat federal funds ratewouldbe
consistent, conditional on current inflation
and real income, with keeping the inflation
rate to a chosen target rate. The diagram
below, from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, shows that from early 2001 until late
2006 the Fed pushed the actual federal funds
rate below the estimated rate that would have
been consistent with targeting a 2 percent
inflation rate. A fortiori the Fed held the actu-
al rate even farther below the path, consistent-
ly targeting stability in nominal income (see
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Figure 1). Thediagramshows that the gapwas
especially large—200 basis point or more—
frommid-2003 tomid-2005.
The demand bubble thus created went
heavily into real estate. Frommid-2003 tomid-
2007, while the dollar volume of final sales of
goods and services was growing at 5 percent to
7 percent, real estate loans at commercial
banks were growing at 10–17 percent.1 Credit-
fueled demand pushed up the sale prices of
existing houses and encouraged the construc-
tion of new housing on undeveloped land, in
both cases absorbing the increased dollar vol-
ume of mortgages. Because real estate is an
especially long-lived asset, its market value is
especially boosted by low interest rates. The
housing sector thus exhibited more than its
share of the price inflation as predicted by the
Taylor Rule.
The Fed’s policy of lowering short-term
interest rates not only fueled growth in the
dollar volume of mortgage lending, but had
unintended consequences for the typeofmort-
gages written. By pushing very-short-term
interest rates down so dramatically between
2001 and 2004, the Fed lowered short-term
rates relative to 30-year rates. Adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMs), typically based on a one-
year interest rate, became increasingly cheap
relative to 30-year fixed-rate mortgages. Back
in 2001, nonteaser ARM rates on average were
1.13 percent cheaper than 30-year fixed-mort-
gages (5.84 percent vs. 6.97 percent). By 2004,
as a result of the ultra-low federal funds rate,
the gap had grown to 1.94 percent (3.90 per-
cent vs. 5.84 percent).2 Not surprisingly,
increasing numbers of newmortgage borrow-
ers were drawn away frommortgages with 30-
year rates into ARMs. The share of new mort-
gages with adjustable rates, only one-fifth in
2001, had more than doubled by 2004. An
adjustable-ratemortgage shifts the risk of refi-
nancing at higher rates from the lender to the
borrower. Many borrowers who took out
ARMs implicitly (and imprudently) counted
on the Fed to keep short-term rates low indef-
initely. They have faced problems as their
monthlypaymentshave adjustedupward.The
shift toward ARMs thus compounded the
mortgage-quality problems arising from regu-
latory mandates and subsidies.
Researchers at the International Monetary
Fundhave corroborated the view that theFed’s
easy-credit policy fueled the housing bubble.
After estimating the sensitivity of U.S. housing
prices and residential investment to interest
rates, they find that “the increase in house
prices and residential investment in theUnited
States over the past six years would have been
muchmore contained had short-term interest
rates remainedunchanged.”3 EvenAlanGreen-
span, who otherwise protests his innocence,
has acknowledged that “the 1 percent rate set
in mid-2003 . . . lowered interest rates on
adjustable-rate mortgages and may have con-
tributed to the rise in U.S. home prices.”
The excess investment in new housing has
resulted in an overbuild of housing stock.
Assuming that the federal government does
not followproposals (tongue-in-cheekorother-
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wise) that it shouldbuyupand then raze excess
houses and condos, or proposals to admit a
large number of new immigrants, house prices
and activity in the U.S. housing construction
industry are going to remain depressed for a
while. The process of adjustment, already well
under way but not yet completed, requires
house prices to fall and workers and capital to
be released from the construction industry to
find more appropriate employment elsewhere.
Correspondingly, an adjustment requires the
book value of existing financial assets based on
housing to be written down and workers and
capital to be released fromwriting and trading
mortgages to find more appropriate employ-
ment elsewhere. No matter how painful the
adjustment process, delaying it only delays the
economy’s recovery.
Mandates and Subsidies to
Write RiskyMortgages
In 2001, the share of existing mortgages
classified as nonprime (subprime or the inter-
mediate category “Alt-A”) was below 10 per-
cent. That share began rising rapidly. Thenon-
prime share of all new mortgage originations
rose close to 34 percent by 2006, bringing the
nonprime share of existing mortgages to 23
percent. Meanwhile the quality of loans with-
in the nonprime category declined, because a
smaller share of nonprime borrowersmade 20
percent down payments on their purchases.4
The expansion in riskymortgages tounder-
qualified borrowers was an imprudence fos-
tered by the federal government. As elaborated
in the paragraphs to follow, there were several
ways that Congress and the executive branch
encouraged the expansion. The first way was
loosening down-payment standards on mort-
gages guaranteed by the Federal Housing
Administration. The second was strengthen-
ing the Community Reinvestment Act. The
third was pressure on lenders by the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development.
The fourth and most important way was sub-
sidizing, through implicit taxpayer guarantees,
the dramatic expansion of the government-
sponsored mortgage buyers Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac; pointedly refusing to moderate
the moral hazard problem of implicit guaran-
teesorotherwise rein in thehyper-expansionof
Fannie and Freddie; and increasingly pushing
Fannie and Freddie to promote affordable
housing” throughexpandedpurchases ofnon-
prime loans to low-income applicants.
The Federal Housing Administration was
founded in 1934 to insure mortgage loans
made by private firms to qualifying borrowers.
For a borrower to qualify, the FHA originally
required—among other things—that the bor-
rowerprovide anonborrowed20percentdown
payment on the house being purchased. Pri-
vate mortgage lenders like savings banks con-
sidered that to be a low down payment at the
time. But private down payment requirements
began falling toward the FHA level. The FHA
reduced its requirements below 20 percent.
Privatemortgage insurance arose for non-FHA
borrowers with down payments below 20 per-
cent. Apparently concerned for bureaucratic
reasons with preventing its “market share”
from shrinking too far, the FHA began lower-
ing its standards to stay below those of private
lenders. By 2004 the required down payment
on the FHA’s most popular program had fall-
en to only 3 percent, and proposals were afoot
in Congress to lower it to zero.5 Mortgages
with very low down payments have had very
high default rates.
The Community Reinvestment Act, first
enacted in 1977, was relatively innocuous for
its first 12 years or so, merely imposing report-
ing requirementsoncommercial banks regard-
ing the extent to which they lent funds back
into the neighborhoods where they gathered
deposits. Congress amended the CRA in 1989
to make banks’ CRA ratings public informa-
tion. Further amendments in 1995 gave the
CRA serious teeth: regulators could now deny
a bank with a low CRA rating approval to
merge with another bank—at a time when the
arrival of interstate banking made such
approvals especially valuable—or even to open
new branches. Complaints from community
organizations would now count against a
bank’s CRA rating. Groups like ACORN (the
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Association of Community Organizations for
Reform Now) began actively pressuring banks
to make loans under the threat that otherwise
they would register complaints in order to
deny the bank valuable approvals.
In response to the new CRA rules, some
banks joined into partnerships with commu-
nity groups to distribute millions in mortgage
money to low-income borrowers previously
considered noncreditworthy. Other banks
tookadvantageof thenewly authorizedoption
to boost their CRA rating by purchasing spe-
cial “CRAmortgage-backed securities,” that is,
packages of disproportionately nonprime
loans certified as meeting CRA criteria and
securitized by Freddie Mac. No doubt a small
share of the total current crop of bad mort-
gages has come from CRA loans. But for the
share of the increase in defaults that has come
from the CRA-qualifying borrowers (who
would otherwise have been turned down for
lack of creditworthiness) rather than from, say,
would-be condo-flippers on the outskirts of
Las Vegas—the CRA bears responsibility.
Defaults and foreclosures are, of course, a
drag on real estate values in poor neighbor-
hoods just as in others. Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke aptly commented in
a 2007 speech that “recent problems in mort-
gage markets illustrate that an underlying
assumption of the CRA—that more lending
equals better outcomes for local communities
maynotalwayshold.”6 (If onlyAlanGreenspan
had recognized that such a warning applies to
credit markets generally and the nation as a
whole, he might not have artificially expanded
total credit so vigorously. We can only hope
that Ben Bernanke will keep his own general-
ized warning inmind henceforth.)
Meanwhile, beginning in 1993, officials in
the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment began bringing legal actions against
mortgage bankers that declined a higher per-
centage of minority applicants than white
applicants. To avoid legal trouble, lenders be-
gan relaxing their down-payment and income
qualifications.7
Congress andHUD also pressured Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. A 1992 law, as
described by Bernanke, “required the govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises, FannieMae and
Freddie Mac, to devote a large percentage of
their activities tomeeting affordable housing
goals.”8 Russell Roberts has cited some rele-
vant numbers in theWall Street Journal:
Beginning in 1992, Congress pushed
FannieMae andFreddieMac to increase
their purchases of mortgages going to
low- and moderate-income borrowers.
For 1996, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) gave
Fannie and Freddie an explicit target—
42 percent of their mortgage financing
had to go to borrowers with income
below the median in their area. The tar-
get increased to 50 percent in 2000 and
52 percent in 2005.
For 1996, HUD required that 12 per-
cent of allmortgage purchases by Fannie
andFreddiebe “special affordable” loans,
typically to borrowers with income less
than 60% of their area’s median income.
That number was increased to 20% in
2000 and 22% in 2005. The 2008 goal
was to be 28%. Between 2000 and 2005,
Fannie andFreddiemet thosegoals every
year, fundinghundredsofbillionsofdol-
lars worth of loans, many of them sub-
prime and adjustable-rate loans, and
made to borrowers who bought houses
with less than 10% down.9
Wayne Barrett of The Village Voice has likewise
drawn attention to how Andrew Cuomo, as
Secretary of HUD between 1997 and 2001,
actively pushed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
into backing the enormous expansion of the
nonprime mortgage market. In the short run,
FannieMae and FreddieMac found that their
new flexible lending lines were profitable, and
they continued to expand their purchases of
nonprime mortgages under the rising goals
set by subsequent HUD Secretaries.10
The hyperexpansion of Fannie Mae and
FreddieMac wasmade possible by their implic-
it backing from theU.S. Treasury. To fund their
enormous growth, Fannie Mae and Freddie
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Mac had to borrow huge sums in wholesale
financial markets. Institutional investors were
willing to lend to the government-sponsored
mortgage companies cheaply—at rates only
slightly above those on the Treasury’s risk-free
securities and well below those paid by other
financial intermediaries—despite the risk of
default that would normally attach to private
firms holding such highly leveraged and poorly
diversifiedportfolios. The investorswere sowill-
ingonlybecause they thought that theTreasury
would repay them should Fannie or Freddie be
unable. As it turns out, they were right. The
Treasury did explicitly guarantee Fannie’s and
Freddie’s debts when the two giants collapsed
andwere placed into conservatorship.
Congress was repeatedly warned by credi-
ble observers about the growing dangers
posed by Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s im-
plicit federal backing. A leading critic was
William Poole, then president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, who as far back as
2003 pointedly warned that the companies
had insufficient capital to survive adverse con-
ditions, and that the problemwould continue
to fester unless Congress explicitly removed
the federal backing from the two companies
so that they would face market discipline.11
Congress did nothing. Efforts to rein in
FannieandFreddiecametonaughtbecause the
two giants had cultivated powerful friends on
CapitolHill.Athearingsof theHouseFinancial
ServicesCommittee inSeptember2003, regard-
ing Bush administration proposals to change
the regulatory oversight of the GSEs, in his
opening statement Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA)
defended the status quo arrangement on the
grounds that it enabled Fannie and Freddie to
lowermortgage interest rates for borrowers:
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
played a very useful role in helping
make housing more affordable, both in
general through leveraging the mort-
gage market, and in particular, they
have a mission that this Congress has
given them in return for some of the
arrangementswhich are of somebenefit
to them to focus on affordable housing,
and that is what I am concerned about
here. I believe that we, as the Federal
Government, have probably done too
little rather than too much to push
them to meet the goals of affordable
housing and to set reasonable goals. . . .
Themorepeople, inmy judgment, exag-
gerate a threat of safety and soundness,
the more people conjure up the possi-
bility of serious financial losses to the
Treasury,which I donot see . . . themore
pressure there is there, then the less I
think we see in terms of affordable
housing.12
In the very same statement Representative
Frank denied that the GSE’s debt had any fed-
eral backing:
But there is no guarantee, there is no
explicit guarantee, there is no implicit
guarantee, there is no wink-and-nod
guarantee. Invest, and you are on your
own.13
Of course, Frank was thinking wishfully and
ignoring the obvious. The very “arrange-
ments which are of some benefit to them,”
that is, the arrangements that enabled Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac to borrow at low rates
(in exchange for which privileges they were
willing to accept affordable housing man-
dates), were nothing other than the implicit
federal guarantees of their debt.
Conclusion
The housing bubble and its aftermath
arose from market distortions created by the
Federal Reserve, government backing of
FannieMae andFreddieMac, theDepartment
of Housing and Urban Development, and the
Federal Housing Authority. We are experienc-
ing theunfortunate results of perverse govern-
ment policies.
The traditional remedy for the severelymis-
taken investment policies of private firms—
shut and dismantle those firms to stop the
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bleeding, free their assets and personnel to go
where they can add value, andmake room for
firms with better entrepreneurial ideas—is as
relevant as ever. A financial market in which
failed enterprises like Freddie Mac or AIG are
never shut down is like an American Idol con-
test in which the poorest singers never go
home. The closure of Lehman Brothers (and
the near-closure of Merrill Lynch), by raising
the interest rate that the market charges to
highly leveraged investment banks, forced
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to
change their business models drastically. The
most effective and appropriate form of busi-
ness regulation is regulationbyprofit and loss.
The long-term remedy for the severely mis-
taken government monetary and regulatory
policies that have produced the current finan-
cial train wreck is similar. We need to identify
and undo policies that distort housing and
financial markets, and dismantle failed agen-
cies whose missions require them to distort
markets. We should be guided by recognizing
the two chief errors that have been made.
Cheap-money policies by the Federal Reserve
System do not produce a sustainable prosper-
ity. Hiding the cost of mortgage subsidies off-
budget, as by imposing affordable housing
regulatory mandates on banks and by provid-
ing implicit taxpayer guarantees on Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac bonds, does not give us
more housing at nobody’s expense.
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